Posts Tagged: law insights

Law of Joint Employment

Law of Joint Employment

A worker’s joint employers are jointly and severally liable for any violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc., 848 F.3d 125, 134 (4th Cir. 2017). This means that for purposes of the FLSA’s requirements that an employer pay minimum wages and overtime wages to non-exempt employees, a worker may have more “employers” than just the company who issues her paychecks. In short, if more than one entity has the ability to help determine the conditions of a workers’ employment, more than one entity may be liable if the worker is not paid the minimum wages or overtime compensation required by federal law.

DOL Joint Employment Regulations

The Department of Labor regulation implementing the FLSA distinguishes “separate and distinct employment” from “joint employment.” 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a). “Separate employment” exists when “all the relevant facts establish that two or more employers are acting entirely independently of each other and are completely disassociated with respect to the” individual’s employment. Id. By contrast, “joint employment” exists when “employment by one employer is not completely disassociated from employment by the other employer(s).” Id. When two or more entities are found to jointly employ a particular worker, “all of the employee’s work for all of the joint employers during the workweek is considered as one employment for purposes of the [FLSA].” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, for example, all hours worked by the employee on behalf of each joint employer are counted together to determine whether the employee is entitled to overtime pay under the FLSA. Id; Hall v. DIRECTV, LLC, 846 F.3d 757, 766 (4th Cir. 2017).

Fourth Circuit Factors

In Salinas, the Fourth Circuit observed that the joint employment regulations speak to “one fundamental question: whether two or more persons or entities are ‘not completely disassociated’ with respect to a worker such that the persons or entities share, agree to allocate responsibility for, or otherwise codetermine — formally or informally, directly or indirectly — the essential terms and conditions of the worker’s employment.” 848 F.3d at 141 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a) and citing In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Employment Practices Litig., 683 F.3d 462, 468 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[W]here two or more employers … share or co-determine those matters governing essential terms and conditions of employment — they constitute ‘joint employers’ under the FLSA.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

With these principles in mind, courts in the Fourth Circuit consider six factors in determining whether entities constitute joint employers:

(1) whether, formally or as a matter of practice, the putative joint employers jointly determine, share, or allocate the power to direct, control, or supervise the worker, whether by direct or indirect means;

(2) whether, formally or as a matter of practice, the putative joint employers jointly determine, share, or allocate the power to, directly or indirectly, hire or fire the worker or modify the terms or conditions of the worker’s employment;

(3) the degree of permanency and duration of the relationship between the putative joint employers;

(4) whether, through shared management or a direct or indirect ownership interest, one putative joint employer controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the other putative joint employer;

(5) whether the work is performed on a premises owned or controlled by one or more of the putative joint employers, independently or in connection with one another; and

(6) whether, formally or as a matter of practice, the putative joint employers jointly determine, share, or allocate responsibility over functions ordinarily carried out by an employer, such as handling payroll, providing workers’ compensation insurance, paying payroll taxes, or providing the facilities, equipment, tools, or materials necessary to complete the work. Id. at 141.

Salinas at 141.

The Fourth Circuit in Salinas observed that these six factors may not constitute an exhaustive list of all potentially relevant considerations. Id. at 142. “To the extent that facts not captured by these factors speak to the fundamental threshold question that must be resolved in every joint employment case — whether a purported joint employer shares or codetermines the essential terms and conditions of a worker’s employment — courts must consider those facts as well.” Id.

As these factors illustrate, the Fourth Circuit’s joint employer test turns on whether the entities in question codetermine the essential conditions of a worker’s employment. Salinas at 143. Thus, the existence of a general contractor-subcontractor relationship “has no bearing on whether entities … constitute joint employers for purposes of the FLSA.” Id. 143–44.

Application of Salinas Factors

For example, in Salinas, the Fourth Circuit held that a drywall installation subcontractor and general contractor were joint employers under the FLSA because, inter alia, the subcontractor provided staffing for the contractor based on the contractor’s needs; the employees performed the work for the contractor’s benefit; the contractor supervised the employees’ progress daily and provided feedback; and the employees wore uniforms bearing the contractor’s logo. 848 F.3d at 146.

For another Fourth Circuit case on the joint employer issue, see Hall v. DIRECTV, LLC, 846 F.3d 757, 762 (4th Cir. 2017). In that case, the plaintiff technicians sufficiently alleged DIRECTV as a joint employer, even though the technicians were nominally employed by a subcontractor. The court held that DIRECTV could be liable as a joint employer along with the subcontractor because, inter alia, the technicians were required to “obtain their work schedules and job assignments through DIRECTV’s centralized system,” to check in with DIRECTV after completing assigned jobs, and to “wear DIRECTV uniforms…when performing work for the company.” Similarly, in Young v. Act Fast Delivery of W. Virginia, Inc., 2018 WL 279996, *8 (S.D. W.Va. Jan. 3, 2018), the court held that under Salinas, a pharmaceutical delivery company was a joint employer of the plaintiff couriers, even though the couriers were nominally employed by a third party subcontractor.

As the Fourth Circuit emphasized in Salinas, “Separate employment exists when … ‘two or more employers are acting entirely independently of each other and are completely disassociated with respect to’ the individual’s employment.” 848 F.3d at 133-34 (emphasis in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a)). “By contrast, joint employment exists when ‘the facts establish … that employment by one employer is not completely disassociated from employment by the other employer.’” Salinas at 134 (emphasis in original).

Summary

Therefore, under the Fourth Circuit’s framework, the “fundamental question” guiding the joint employment analysis is “whether two or more persons or entities are ‘not completely disassociated’ with respect to a worker such that the persons or entities share, agree to allocate responsibility for, or otherwise codetermine — formally or informally, directly or indirectly — the essential terms and conditions of the worker’s employment.” Id. at 140. If the facts show that two related companies were not “completely disassociated” or “acting entirely independently” with respect to a worker’s employment, they may be joint employers. If the entities shared control over the conditions of employment, they may both be potentially jointly and severally liable for FLSA violations as joint employers.

This site is intended to provide general information only. The information you obtain at this site is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship between you and attorney Tim Coffield or Coffield PLC. Parts of this site may be considered attorney advertising. If you have questions about any particular issue or problem, you should contact your attorney. Please view the full disclaimer. If you would like to request a consultation with attorney Tim Coffield, you may call 1-434-218-3133 or send an email to info@coffieldlaw.com.

McKennon v. Nashville Banner: Law of After-Acquired Evidence

McKennon v. Nashville Banner: Law of After-Acquired Evidence

What happens when an employer, having wrongfully terminated an employee (in violation of federal employment law), discovers in litigation that the employee did something that would have legitimately and lawfully lead to termination, had the employer known about it before wrongfully firing the employee? Does the employer still have to pay lost wages for the wrongful termination, or does this “after-acquired evidence” excuse the violation?

The Supreme Court addressed these questions in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995). The Court rejected the argument that a legitimate reason for termination, discovered after an unlawful discharge, excuses the unlawful action or bars the employee from recovery. However, the Court also indicated that such after-acquired evidence may limit the employee’s ability to obtain reinstatement or recover all lost wages associated with the termination.

Facts

McKennon worked thirty years for Nashville Banner Publishing Company until she was terminated at age sixty-two. McKennon filed suit, alleging that her discharge violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). McKennon’s suit sought a variety of legal and equitable remedies available under the ADEA, including backpay. In her deposition, McKennon admitted that during her final year of employment she had copied and taken home several of the Banner’s confidential financial documents. 513 U.S. 354-56.

For the purposes of summary judgment, the Banner conceded that it had discriminated against McKennon because of her age. Id. The District Court, however, granted summary judgment for the company, holding that McKennon’s misconduct in taking the confidential documents was grounds for termination and that neither back pay nor any other remedy was available to her under the ADEA. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the same reasoning. McKennon appealed. Id. at 355-56.

The Court’s Decision

The Court reversed. It held that an employee who is fired in violation of federal employment law is not barred from all relief when, after her discharge, her employer discovers evidence of wrongdoing that would have led to her termination on lawful and legitimate grounds had the employer known of it. 513 U.S. 356-360.

After-Acquired Evidence Not a Complete Bar

First, the Court held that this kind of “after-acquired evidence” is not a complete bar to recovery. The Court reasoned that even if the employee engaged in misconduct that would have prompted a termination, the employer’s discrimination that actually prompted the discharge cannot be disregarded. The Court assessed the purposes of the ADEA’s remedial provisions, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) and 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which (like the remedial provisions of other employment laws) were designed both to compensate employees for injuries caused by unlawful discrimination and to deter employers from discriminating in the first place. The Court concluded that allowing after-acquired evidence to bar all relief would frustrate both of these important objectives. Therefore, the Court held that after-acquired evidence did not bar all relief for unlawful discrimination. Id. at 358-360.

Relevance to Crafting an Appropriate Remedy

Second, however, the Court observed that trial courts should take into account after-acquired evidence of an employee’s wrongdoing in determining the specific remedy for the employer’s discrimination. To hold otherwise, and bar any consideration of employee misbehavior in the relief analysis, would be to ignore the employer’s legitimate concerns about employee misconduct. The ADEA, like other employment laws, just prohibits discrimination. It does not limit employers from having legitimate rules and exercising appropriate lawful discretion in hiring, promoting, and firing employees. Therefore, the Court noted, employee wrongdoing is relevant in taking due account of such lawful prerogatives and the employer’s corresponding equities arising from the wrongdoing. Id. at 360-61.

General Rule: No Reinstatement or Front Pay

Third, the Court discussed how trial courts might balance these competing concerns — on one hand, the prohibition against unlawful discrimination, and on the other, the employer’s right to address legitimate employee misconduct in an appropriate manner. The Court decided that remedial relief in such cases should be addressed on a case-by-case basis. However, the Court stated that as a general rule, if the employer proves the employee engaged in misconduct that would have prompted a lawful termination had the employer known about it, neither reinstatement nor front pay is an appropriate remedy. Id. at 362. This is because “it would be both inequitable and pointless to order the reinstatement of someone the employer would have terminated, and will terminate, in any event and upon lawful grounds.” Id.

Possible Limitations on Back Pay

The Court indicated that the more difficult issue, in after-acquired evidence cases, is the proper measure of back pay. This is because even a guilty employer cannot be required to ignore information it learns about employee wrongdoing that would lead to a legitimate discharge, even if it is acquired during the course of a discrimination lawsuit and might have gone undiscovered in the absence of the discrimination that led to the lawsuit. Id. at 362. The Court stated that the “beginning point in formulating a remedy should therefore be calculation of backpay from the date of the unlawful discharge to the date the new information was discovered.” Id. In determining the appropriate relief, the court can consider extraordinary equitable circumstances that affect the legitimate interests of either party. But an “absolute rule barring any recovery of backpay, however, would undermine the [federal employment law’s] objective of forcing employers to consider and examine their motivations, and of penalizing them for employment decisions that spring from … discrimination.” Id. Thus, as a general rule, after-acquired evidence does not bar back pay, but it might limit the amount of back pay an employee can recover.

No Bar to General Compensatory, Punitive, or Liquidated Damages

It is also worth noting that McKennon did not state or suggest that compensatory damages for past or future emotional harm should be time-limited. The decision only addressed possible limitations on lost wages and reinstatement. Allowing full emotional distress damages even if the defendant prevails on an after-acquired evidence defense makes good sense in light of McKennon’s reasoning. This is because no legitimate business prerogative would be served by allowing a proven discriminator to avoid paying the full cost of the emotional damage caused by the discrimination. The same reasoning supports the conclusion that after-acquired evidence does not bar punitive damages or liquidated damages, in cases where the usual standards for awarding punitive or liquidated damages are met. Here is a link to EEOC’s guidance on this issue.

Employer’s Burden of Proof

Finally, the Court discussed the employer’s burden in attempting to prove an “after-acquired evidence” defense. When an employer seeks to use this defense, it must first establish that the wrongdoing was of “such severity that the employee in fact would have been terminated on those grounds alone had the employer known of it at the time of the discharge.” Id. at 362-63. The Court also expressed concern that, due to the possibility of uncovering after-acquired evidence, employers might routinely undertake extensive discovery into an employee’s background or job performance to resist employment discrimination claims. Id. at 363. However, the Court concluded the trial courts’ authority to award attorney’s fees under §§ 216(b) and 626(b) and to invoke the appropriate provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would likely deter most abuses of the discovery rules. Id.

Analysis

The Court in McKennon rejected the notion that a legitimate reason for termination, discovered after an unlawful discharge, excuses the unlawful action or bars the employee from recovery. However, such after-acquired evidence may limit the employee’s ability to obtain reinstatement or recover all lost wages associated with the termination. To use this defense, an employer must prove that the employee engaged in misconduct of such severity that the employee would have been terminated on those grounds alone had the employer learned of it during her employment. As a general rule, if the employer meets this burden, reinstatement is not an appropriate remedy and back pay may be limited.

This site is intended to provide general information only. The information you obtain at this site is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship between you and attorney Tim Coffield or Coffield PLC. Parts of this site may be considered attorney advertising. If you have questions about any particular issue or problem, you should contact your attorney. Please view the full disclaimer. If you would like to request a consultation with attorney Tim Coffield, you may call 1-434-218-3133 or send an email to info@coffieldlaw.com.

Corning Glass Works v. Brennan: EPA Law Requires Equal Pay for Equal Work

In Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974), the Supreme Court addressed the allocation of proof in pay discrimination claims under the Equal Pay Act of 1963. This was the first Supreme Court decision applying the Equal Pay Act. The Court held that to prevail on an EPA claim, the plaintiff must prove that the employer pays an employee of the one sex more than it pays an employee of the other sex for substantially equal work. The opinion addressed what it meant for two employees to perform “substantially equal work” for the purposes of the Equal Pay Act, including what it means for work to be performed under “similar working conditions.” 

Facts

Corning was a glassworks company. It employed night shift inspectors and day shift inspectors at its plants. For many years, Corning allowed only men to work the night shift, and it paid night shift inspectors more than it paid the day shift inspectors, who were women. In June 1966, three years after the passage of the Equal Pay Act, Corning began opening the night shift jobs to women, allowing female employees to apply for the higher-paid night inspection jobs on an equal seniority basis with men.  

In January 1969, Corning implemented a new “job evaluation” system for setting wage rates. Under that pay system, all subsequently-hired inspectors were to receive the same base wage (which was higher than the previous night shift rate) regardless of sex or shift. With respect to employees hired before the new pay system went into effect, however, the pay plan provided that those employees who worked the night shift would continue to receive a higher (“red circle”) rate. Because of this “red circle” rate, the new pay system perpetuated the previous difference in base pay between day and night inspectors, thereby also perpetuating the previous disparity in pay between female (day) inspectors and male (night) inspectors. 

The Equal Pay Act prohibits an employer from paying different wages to employees of opposite sexes “for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions,” except where the difference in payment is made pursuant to a seniority or merit system or one measuring earnings by quantity or quality of production, or where the differential is “based on any other factor other than sex.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)

The Secretary of Labor brought suit, asserting that Corning’s pay practices violated the EPA by paying male and female inspectors differently for equal work. 

The Court’s Decision

The Court addressed the question of whether Corning’s pay practices violated the EPA by paying different wages to employees of opposite sexes for “equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions[.]” The Court found that they did. 

First, the Court held that Corning’s pay practices from the passage of the EPA in 1963 to June 1966 violated the EPA, because during that period the night shift inspectors (all male) were paid more than the day shift inspectors (female) and the night shift and day shift inspectors performed equal work “under similar working conditions.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). Corning argued the difference between working at night and working at day meant the different positions did not entail similar working conditions. The Court rejected this argument, holding that the EPA’s legislative history established that the statutory term “working conditions,” as used in the EPA, encompasses only physical surroundings and hazards, and not the time of day worked. 417 U.S. 197-204.

Corning also argued that the pre-1966 pay disparity was lawful because the higher pay to (male) night inspectors was intended as additional compensation for the inconvenience of night work, and thus the pay disparity was based on a “factor other than sex[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). The Court rejected this argument, holding the evidence showed the pay disparity in fact arose because men would not work for the low rates paid to women inspectors. The pay disparity therefore “reflected a job market in which Corning could pay women less than men for the same work.” 417 U.S. 204-05.

Second, the Court held that Corning did not remedy its violation of the EPA in June 1966 simply by permitting women to work as night shift inspectors, because the violation could only be cured by increasing the base wages of female day inspectors to meet the higher rates paid to night inspectors. Corning’s action in allowing women to work the night shift did not accomplish this, as “Corning’s action still left the inspectors on the day shift — virtually all women — earning a lower base wage than the night shift inspectors because of a differential initially based on sex and still not justified by any other consideration[.]” 417 U.S. 207-08. In effect, “Corning was still taking advantage of the availability of female labor to fill its day shift at a differentially low wage rate not justified by any factor other than sex.” Id. Thus, Corning’s allowing women to work the night shift, without increasing base pay to the female day shift workers, did not remedy the EPA violation. 

Finally, the Court held the Corning did not remedy its violation of the EPA in January 1969 with its pay plan equalizing day and night inspector rates, because the plan’s higher “red circle” rate paid to employees who previously worked the night shift only perpetuated the previous unlawful pay disparity. This was because the previously-hired male night shift workers would receive the higher red circle rate based on their pre-1969 pay — before day and night wage rates were equalized. Thus, the pay plan had the unlawful effect of continuing the pay disparity between men and women for equal work. As the Court observed, “the company’s continued discrimination in base wages between night and day workers, though phrased in terms of a neutral factor other than sex, nevertheless operated to perpetuate the effects of the company’s prior illegal practice of paying women less than men for equal work.” 417 U.S. 209-10.

Analysis

This case was important because it marked the first time the Supreme Court addressed the requirements of the Equal Pay Act. The Court held that to prevail on an EPA claim, the plaintiff must prove that the employer pays an employee of one sex more than it pays an employee of the other sex for substantially equal work. The opinion addressed what it meant for two employees to perform “substantially equal work” for the purposes of the EPA, and held that the requirement for work to be performed under “similar working conditions” referred to physical surroundings and hazards, and not the time of day worked. If a male employee and a female employee perform equal work at different times of the day, they should therefore be given equal pay — unless the pay disparity is based on a seniority or merit system or one measuring earnings by quantity or quality of production, or where the differential is “based on any other factor other than sex.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). If an employer’s pay practices violate the EPA, the only way to cure the violation is to equalize wages between men and women — simply offering women the same job titles is not sufficient. And pay systems that have the effect of perpetuating prior discrimination may still violate the EPA — even if the pay system is neutrally-worded and made without intent to discriminate. 

This site is intended to provide general information only. The information you obtain at this site is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship between you and attorney Tim Coffield or Coffield PLC. Parts of this site may be considered attorney advertising. If you have questions about any particular issue or problem, you should contact your attorney. Please view the full disclaimer. If you would like to request a consultation with attorney Tim Coffield, you may call 1-434-218-3133 or send an email to info@coffieldlaw.com.

Civil Rights Act of 1866: Racial Discrimination Unlawful

Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in the aftermath of the Civil War, when many southern states were passing laws restricting the legal rights of newly-freed slaves. The 1866 Act, among other things, conferred upon “all citizens” and “all persons” the same rights to own property and to make and enforce contracts, respectively. 

Since 1866, the Act has been re-enacted several times with some modifications. Of particular importance in the employment context, one portion of this law is now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In relevant part, Section 1981 provides that “All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right … to make and enforce contracts … as is enjoyed by white citizens[.]” Because the employer-employee relationship is a type of contractual relationship, Section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the employment context. 

In practice, Section 1981 functions similarly to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in that it prohibits employers from intentionally discriminating against employees on the basis of race. For example, the tests for proving a racially hostile work environment asserted under Section 1981 and Title VII are the same. Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 277 (4th Cir. 2015). Under both laws, an employer is liable for a racially hostile workplace when the plaintiff can show “(1) unwelcome conduct; (2) that is based on the plaintiff’s … race; (3) which is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiff’s conditions of employment and to create an abusive work environment; and (4) which is imputable to the employer.” Id. at 277 (citing Okoli v. City of Balt., 648 F.3d 216, 220 (4th Cir. 2011)). 

Title VII and Section 1981 differ, however, in several important aspects.

Section 1981 Requires Intentional Discrimination

Title VII contains a provision that makes it unlawful for employers to implement practices that impact individuals of one race more than individuals of other races, even if this employer did not intend for the practice to be discriminatory. This “disparate impact” provision of Title VII prohibits an employer from “us[ing] a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race [or other protected characteristics]” so long as the employer “fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job-related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A). Thus, an employer can violate Title VII’s prohibition on racial discrimination without intending to do so. 

Section 1981 does not have an analogous provision. Section 1981 claims, therefore, require evidence of intentional discrimination. The Supreme Court has rejected the argument “that a violation of § 1981 could be made out by proof of disparate impact….” Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 383 n.8 (1982). In discussing the history of the statute and comparing it to Title VII, the Court explained Section 1981 was enacted to prevent purposeful discrimination and “did not include practices that were neutral on their face … but that had the incidental effect of disadvantaging blacks to a greater degree than whites.” Id. at 388. (quotation omitted).

Section 1981 Does Not Require an EEOC Charge

To bring a race discrimination claim under Title VII in court, a plaintiff must first file a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Before she can file a Title VII race discrimination claim in court, the plaintiff must then wait for the EEOC to complete its investigation and issue a Notice of Suit Rights. By contrast, a plaintiff may bring a lawsuit under Section 1981 for racial discrimination without first going through the EEOC process. 

Section 1981 Has a Longer Statute of Limitations than Title VII

Title VII claims have a relatively short statute of limitations — depending on the state, Title VII race discrimination claims generally must be reported to the EEOC within 180 or 300 days of the employer’s discriminatory actions, and a Title VII lawsuit must be filed in court within 90 days of the employee’s receipt of suit rights from the EEOC. By contrast, the text of Section 1981 does not specify a particular time limit within which claims must be filed. Section 1981 violations are therefore subject to the general four-year statute of limitations for civil actions arising under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1658. Section 1981 claims may therefore be brought in court within four years of the discriminatory action at issue. 

Title VII Covers More Types of Discrimination than Section 1981

Section 1981 only applies to discrimination based on race. Title VII, by contrast, outlaws race discrimination as well as discrimination based on “religion, sex, and national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Section 1981 Applies to All Employers, Regardless of Size

Title VII only prohibits racial discrimination by employers with fifteen or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Section 1981, by contrast, contains no such limitation. Because the terms of Section 1981 apply to all forms of contracting, it applies to all employers regardless of size — including employers with fewer than fifteen employees.

Both Laws Allow Recovery of Compensatory and Punitive Damages, but Section 1981 Does Not Cap Damages

Title VII is subject to caps limiting the amount of compensatory and punitive damages an employer may be required to pay for violating the law. The applicable caps range from $50,000 to $300,000, depending on how many employees the employer has. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). The relevant statute authorizes compensatory damages for “future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). The same statute further allows punitive damages against private-sector employers for Title VII violations if the plaintiff shows the employer “engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1).

Section 1981, by contrast, does not include a cap on damages. While the text of Section 1981 does not specifically discuss damages, courts have affirmed compensatory damages awards under Section 1981, Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), and held that a prevailing Section 1981 plaintiff is entitled under the common law to punitive damages “under certain circumstances,” Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975). Specifically, punitive damages may be awarded “for conduct [by the defendant] exhibiting malice, an evil motive, or recklessness or callous indifference to a federally protected right,” Stephens v. South Atlantic Canners, Inc., 848 F.2d 484, 489 (4th Cir. 1988); Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 206 F.3d 431, 441 (4th Cir. 2000). This standard comes from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983), in which the Court held that punitive damages are available under the common law in an action under the civil rights statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith, 461 U.S. at 56. 

This site is intended to provide general information only. The information you obtain at this site is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship between you and attorney Tim Coffield or Coffield PLC. Parts of this site may be considered attorney advertising. If you have questions about any particular issue or problem, you should contact your attorney. Please view the full disclaimer. If you would like to request a consultation with attorney Tim Coffield, you may call 1-434-218-3133 or send an email to info@coffieldlaw.com.

Griggs v. Duke Power: Disparate Impact Without Discriminatory Intent

The Supreme Court’s decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971), addressed the Title VII issues created by employer policies that are facially neutral, but which adversely impact employees on the basis of race, sex, or religion. In short, the Griggs Court decided that where an employer uses a neutral policy or rule, or utilizes a neutral test, and this policy or test disproportionately affects minorities or women in an adverse manner, then the neutral rule or test violates Title VII unless the employer proves it is justified by “business necessity.”

Summary

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from treating employees differently because of their race, sex, or religion. This means, obviously, that an employer cannot refuse to hire an applicant because of the applicant’s race. But sometimes employers may implement policies, or require applicants to take tests, that work to disadvantaged members of one sex, race, or religion over others — even though the employer may not have intended the policy or test to have that effect. For example, in Griggs, Duke Power had a policy that required employees in all but its lowest-paying jobs to have a high school diploma or pass “intelligence” tests. There was no evidence Duke Power intended this policy to discriminate against minority workers. The employees in Griggs argued this policy violated Title VII because it disproportionately impacted black workers.

The Griggs Court reasoned that Congress designed Title VII to address the consequences of employment practices and not just the employer’s motivation. Therefore, a neutrally-worded employment policy or test that has the effect of disproportionately impacting employees of one sex, race, or religion, may be unlawful under Title VII even if the employer did not intend that policy or test to be discriminatory in that way. The Griggs decision made it possible for employees to challenge employment practices that disadvantage certain groups if the employer cannot show the policy is justified by business necessity and paved the way for the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which codified the “disparate impact” theory of discrimination endorsed by Griggs.

Facts

Before Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Duke Power intentionally discriminated against African-American employees by only allowing these employees to work in the company’s low-paying labor department. In 1955, the company implemented a policy requiring potential employees to have a high school diploma before they could work in any department except for the labor department. After the Civil Rights Act went into effect in 1965, Duke Power extended this policy to block employees who had not graduated high school from transferring or being promoted from its labor department to other departments within the company. Duke Power later amended this policy to allow employees who had not graduated high school to transfer from labor to other departments provided they were able to garner certain scores on “intelligence” tests. Here’s an article about the history behind this case.

Griggs filed a class action on behalf of twelve African American employees, claiming this diploma/testing policy violated Title VII by disproportionately impacting black workers. The case did not involve evidence that Duke Power intended its policy to harm black workers. The issue, then, was whether an employer’s facially neutral policy or test could violate the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII on the grounds that the policy had the effect of disadvantaging minority workers.

Procedural Posture

The trial court dismissed the complaint. Griggs appealed. The Fourth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that in the absence of a discriminatory purpose, Duke Power’s policy requiring a high school diploma or passing an “intelligence” test as a condition of employment was lawful under the Civil Rights Act. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, rejected Griggs’ claim that because Duke Power’s policy operated to render ineligible for employment a disproportionately high number of minority workers, the policy violated Title VII’s anti-discrimination provisions unless the employer proved the policy was job-related.

The Court’s Decision

The Court reversed. It held that Title VII prohibited Duke Power from requiring employees to produce a high school diploma or pass an “intelligence” test as a condition of employment, because Duke Power failed to show that these standards were significantly related to successful job performance, and both requirements operated to disqualify minority workers at a substantially higher rate than white applicants. The Court also observed that the jobs in question formerly had been filled only by white employees as part of Duke Power’s long-standing practice of giving preference to whites.

The Court pointed out that Congress’ objective for Title VII was to “achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees.” 401 U.S. at 429–30. Therefore, under Title VII, “practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.” Id. at 430. Intent is not dispositive. Title VII requires “the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.” Id. at 431.

The critical point here was the Court’s understanding that “good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.” Id. at 432; see also Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701 et seq., 703(a) (2), (h), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., 2000e–2(a) (2), (h). Title VII “proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.” 401 U.S. at 431.

After all, Congress intended Title VII to address “the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.” Id. at 432. More than that, Title VII places on the employer “the burden of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question.” Id. Therefore, an employer’s facially-neutral policy or test can violate the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII if the policy has the effect of disadvantaging minority workers, and the employer fails to prove the policy or test is justified by “business necessity.” Id. at 431. “If an employment practice which operates to exclude [minority workers] cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.” Id.

Analysis

After Griggs, a neutrally-worded employment policy or test that has the effect of disproportionately impacting employees of one sex, race, or religion, may be unlawful under Title VII even if the employer did not intend that policy or test to be discriminatory in that way. The Griggs decision made it possible for employees to challenge employment practices that disadvantage certain groups if the employer cannot show the policy is justified by business necessity. Griggs also paved the way for the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (text here) which codified the “disparate impact” theory of discrimination endorsed by Griggs. In contrast to disparate treatment cases, which often turn on evidence of the employer’s intent, disparate impact cases commonly use statistical analyses to assess whether an employer’s policy or test runs afoul of Title VII by disproportionately harming employees of a certain race(s), sex, or religion.

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