Posts Tagged: legal insights

Kasten v. Saint-Gobain: Scope of FLSA Protected Activity

In Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1 (2011), the Supreme Court held that the anti-retaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act protects employees who make oral (as well as written) complaints that their employer violated the FLSA.

Facts

Kasten worked for Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics. He complained orally to his superiors that the company located its timeclocks between the area where Kasten and his co-workers put on (and removed) their work-related protective gear and the area where they carried out their job duties. This location, Kasten complained, prevented workers from receiving credit for the time they spent putting on and taking off their work clothes — contrary to the requirements of the FLSA. Kasten complained only orally and did not make a written complaint. Saint-Gobain fired him. Id. at 5-6.

Kasten then sued his former employer, alleging that Saint-Gobain violated the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision by terminating him for complaining orally about the legality of the location of the timeclocks. The trial court granted summary judgment for the employer, holding that the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision covered only written complaints and did not cover oral complaints. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and Kasten appeals.

The Court’s Decision

The FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision makes it unlawful for employers “to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to [the FLSA], or has testified or is about to testify in such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee.” 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (emphasis added).

The Court held that the scope of the statutory term “filed any complaint” includes oral, as well as written, complaints — and therefore the FLSA prohibits retaliation against employees who complain orally about violations of the wage and hour law.

As an initial matter, the Court cited its decision in Dolan v. Postal Service, 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2013) for the principle that proper interpretation “depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the [statute’s] purpose and context …, and consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the analysis.” The Court further explained that the text at issue — “filed any complaint” — taken alone, could not provide a conclusive answer as to whether it included oral complaints. Some dictionary definitions of “filed” contemplated a writing; others permitted using “file” in conjunction with oral material.

The Court noted that in addition to dictionary definitions, state statutes and federal regulations sometimes contemplate oral filings, and an analysis of contemporaneous judicial usage shows that when the FLSA was passed in 1938 oral filings were a known phenomenon. And even if “filed,” taken in isolation, might suggest a narrow interpretation limited to writings, the remainder of the phrase — “any complaint” — suggested a broad interpretation that would include an oral complaint. Thus, the Court concluded that the phrase “filed any complaint,” taken by itself, was not clear. Id. at 5-11.

Nor could the FLSA’s other references to “filed” resolve the question of whether oral complaints were included. Some parts of the FLSA involve filed material that is almost always written; others specifically require a writing, and others leave the oral/written question unresolved. Because the text at issue, taken alone, might, or might not, encompass oral complaints, the Court had to look to other methods of interpretation. Id. at 5-11.

The Court observed that several “functional considerations” indicated that Congress intended the anti-retaliation provision to cover both oral and written complaints. Id. at 11. First, looking to the FLSA’s purposes, the Court noted that a narrow interpretation excluding oral complaints would undermine the law’s basic objective: to prohibit “labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers,” 29 U.S.C. § 202(a). The Court had previously observed that the FLSA relies for enforcement of its substantive standards on “information and complaints received from employees,” Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960), and its anti-retaliation provision makes the enforcement scheme effective by preventing “fear of economic retaliation” from inducing workers “quietly to accept substandard conditions[.]” Ibid. With that purpose in mind, the Court noted that limiting the provision’s scope to written complaints could have the undesirable result of preventing Government agencies from using hotlines, interviews, and other oral methods to receive complaints. 563 U.S. at 11-14.

Second, the Court determined that in light of the delegation of enforcement powers to federal agencies, the agencies’ views about the meaning of the phrase “filed any complaint” should be given weight. The Secretary of Labor, charged with enforcing the FLSA, has long interpreted “filed any complaint” as covering both oral and written complaints. Similarly, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, charged with enforcing other employment laws, has a similar view that oral complaints are protected complaints. The Court held that these views were reasonable and consistent with the FLSA. And the length of time the Secretary of Labor held its position suggested it was the result of careful consideration, not “post hoc rationalizatio[n].” Id. at 14-16 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983)).

Finally, Saint-Gobain made an alternative argument that the anti-retaliation provision only covered official complaints to government agencies or in court, and therefore did not protect internal complaints (written or oral) to employers. The Court declined to address this argument, however, because it was not properly raised in the certiorari briefs and did not need to be addressed to resolve the oral/written complaint issue. Id. at 17.

Scalia dissented on that point, arguing that the language of anti-retaliation provision, in light of the FLSA’s other references to “filing,” only protected official grievances filed with a court or an agency, not oral complaints — or even formal, written complaints — from an employee to an employer. Id. at 18-26.

Analysis

Kasten clarified that an oral complaint about an employer’s FLSA violation is protected activity under the FLSA. The law therefore prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who complaint about violations of the federal wage and hour law, regardless of whether the employee complains orally or in writing.

This blog was also posted to TimCoffieldAttorney.com.

This site is intended to provide general information only. The information you obtain at this site is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship between you and attorney Tim Coffield or Coffield PLC. Parts of this site may be considered attorney advertising. If you have questions about any particular issue or problem, you should contact your attorney. Please view the full disclaimer. If you would like to request a consultation with attorney Tim Coffield, you may call 1-434-218-3133 or send an email to info@coffieldlaw.com.

Christensen v. Harris County: Compelled Use of FLSA Compensatory Time

In Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), the Supreme Court held that the Fair Labor Standards Act does not prohibit public employers from compelling employees to use compensatory time.

Background

The Fair Labor Standards Act allows public employers (including states and their political subdivisions) to compensate employees for overtime work by granting them compensatory time instead of paying them a cash overtime wage. 29 U.S.C. § 207(o). Compensatory time is paid time off. To comply with this part of the FLSA, the public employer must provide the compensatory time at a rate not less than one and one-half hours for each hour of overtime worked. Id. Compensatory time can accumulate, like vacation time. Importantly, if employees do not use their accumulated compensatory time, under certain circumstances the FLSA requires the public employer to pay the employees cash compensation. 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(o)(3)-(4).

Facts

Employees in Harris County accumulated a great volume of unused compensatory time. This caused Harris County to worry that a budget crisis would result if it had to pay its employees for their accrued unused compensatory time. In an effort to avoid that situation, the county adopted a policy requiring its employees to schedule time off. The county’s reasoning was that requiring time off would reduce the amount of accrued compensatory time among its workers, thereby reducing the likelihood of a budget crisis from having to pay for unused compensatory time.

Ed Christensen was a Harris County deputy sheriff. He and a group of fellow deputy sheriffs sued the county, claiming the policy of requiring employees to use their compensatory time violated the FLSA. Christensen argued that the FLSA does not permit an employer to compel an employee to use compensatory time in the absence of an agreement allowing the employer to do so. The District Court ruled for Christensen and entered a declaratory judgment that the county’s policy violated the FLSA. The Fifth Circuit reversed. It held that the FLSA did not address the issue of compelling the use of compensatory time and therefore did not prohibit the county from implementing its policy.

The Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither the text of the FLSA nor its implementing regulations prohibits a public employer from compelling its employees to use their compensatory time.

First, the Court rejected Christensen’s argument that § 207(o)(5) of the FLSA implicitly prohibits compelled use of compensatory time in the absence of an agreement. That section provides that an employer must grant an employee’s request to use her compensatory time unless doing so would unduly disrupt the employer’s operations. 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(5). Citing Raleigh & Gaston R. Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall. 269, 270 (1872) for the proposition that when a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it implicitly disallows any other mode, Christensen argued that because § 207(o)(5) allowed only an employee to require the use of compensatory time, that section implicitly prohibited an employer from requiring the use of compensatory time. Id. at 583-84. The Court disagreed with that conclusion. Instead, it found that the only “negative inference” to be drawn from § 207(o)(5) was that an employer may not deny a request for any reason other than that provided in § 207(o)(5). Id. Thus, the section did not prohibit employers from compelling the use of compensatory time.

The Court went on to explain that the purpose of § 207(o)(5) was to ensure that an employee receive “some timely benefit for overtime work.” Id. at 584. The FLSA’s nearby provisions reflect a similar concern. For example, § 207(o)(3)(A) provides that workers may not accrue more than 240 or 480 hours of compensatory time, depending upon the nature of the job. This provision “helps guarantee that employees only accrue amounts of compensatory time that they can reasonably use.” Christensen at 584. Similarly, the Court observed that § 207(o)(2)(B) conditions an employer’s ability to provide compensatory time (in lieu of paying cash overtime wages) upon the employee not accruing compensatory time in excess of the § 207(o)(3)(A) limits. Thus, these provisions, like § 207(o)(5), reflect a legislative concern that employees receive “some timely benefit in exchange for overtime work.” Christensen at 584.

The Court therefore concluded that the best reading of the FLSA is that it ensures liquidation of compensatory time. The law places restrictions on an employer’s ability to prohibit employees from using their compensatory time. But it says nothing about restricting an employer’s efforts to require employees to use the time. Id. at 585. Because the FLSA text is silent on this issue and because the county’s policy was compatible with § 207(o)(5), the Court held that Christensen could not, as § 216(b) of the FLSA requires, prove that the county violated the FLSA’s overtime provisions.

The Court further noted that two other features of the FLSA supported its reading that the FLSA did not prohibit employers from compelling the use of compensatory time. First, the FLSA allows employers to decrease the number of hours that employees work. Id. at 585 (citing Barrentine v. Arkansas—Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739 (1981) (“[T]he FLSA was designed … to ensure that each employee covered by the Act … would be protected from the evil of overwork …”). And second, the FLSA expressly allows employers to cash out accumulated compensatory time by paying the employee her regular hourly wage for each hour accrued. Id. at 585 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(3)(B) & 29 CFR § 553.27(a)(1999). Thus, the FLSA allows an employer to require an employee to take time off work, and to use the money it would have paid in wages to cash out accrued compensatory time. Id. at 585. The Court concluded that Harris County’s policy of compelling the use of compensatory time “merely involves doing both of these steps at once.” Id. at 586.

Christensen also argued, unsuccessfully, that employers were prohibited from compelling the use of compensatory time pursuant a Department of Labor opinion letter. In that letter, the DOL concluded that an employer may compel the use of compensatory time only if the employee has agreed in advance to such a practice. Id. at 586-87. The Court observed that the opinion letter was not entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), because interpretations contained in opinion letters — similar to policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law — do not warrant Chevron deference. While “persuasive” interpretations in opinion letters are “entitled to respect” under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) the Court concluded DOL’s interpretation was not persuasive. Id. at 587.

While Chevron deference does apply to an agency interpretation contained in a regulation, the regulation at issue, 29 CFR § 553.23(a)(2), provided only that “[t]he agreement or understanding [between the employer and employee] may include other provisions governing the preservation, use, or cashing out of compensatory time so long as these provisions are consistent with [§ 207(o)].” Id.; Christensen at 587-88. The Court concluded that nothing in 29 CFR § 553.23(a)(2) “even arguably” requires that an employer’s compelled use policy must be included in an agreement. Id. 588. Thus, Chevron deference did not apply. Lastly, deference to an agency’s interpretation of its regulation is warranted under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997), only when the regulation’s language is ambiguous. The Court held that the DOL’s regulation was not ambiguous, and therefore the DOL’s interpretation of that regulation was not entitled to Auer deference. Id. at 588.

Analysis

In sum, Christensen held that the FLSA does not prohibit public employers from compelling their employees to use their accrued compensatory time. While this issue is not specifically addressed in the text of the FLSA, the law does not explicitly prohibit this practice, and the conclusion that public employers may compel the use of compensatory time is consistent with other aspects of the FLSA that allow an employer to require employees to take time off from work and to use the money it would have paid in wages to cash out accrued compensatory time.

This site is intended to provide general information only. The information you obtain at this site is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship between you and attorney Tim Coffield or Coffield PLC. Parts of this site may be considered attorney advertising. If you have questions about any particular issue or problem, you should contact your attorney. Please view the full disclaimer. If you would like to request a consultation with attorney Tim Coffield, you may call 1-434-218-3133 or send an email to info@coffieldlaw.com.

This blog was also posted to Tim Coffield, Attorney’s law blog, TimCoffieldAttorney.com.

Independent Contractor v. Employee: Law of Economic Realities

In cases under the Fair Labor Standards Act, a question sometimes arises as to whether a worker is an independent contractor or an employee. The answer can be important, as an employee may have rights to minimum wage and overtime compensation that an independent contractor performing the same basic job tasks does not.  

To determine whether a worker is an employee under the FLSA, courts in the Fourth Circuit look to the “economic realities” of the relationship between the worker and the putative employer.

McFeeley v. Jackson St. Entm’t, LLC, 825 F.3d 235, 241 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Schultz v. Capital Int’l Sec., Inc., 466 F.3d 298, 304 (4th Cir. 2006)). The touchstone of the “economic realities” test is whether the worker is “economically dependent on the business to which he renders service or is, as a matter of economic [reality], in business for himself.” Id. If the practical economic reality is that the worker is “economically dependent” on the putative employer and not “in business for himself[,]” the worker will generally be considered an employee qualified for FLSA rights. Id

Economic Realities Test

In making this determination, courts applying the economic realities test consider six factors:

(1) [T]he degree of control that the putative employer has over the manner in which the work is performed;

(2) the worker’s opportunities for profit or loss dependent on his managerial skill;

(3) the worker’s investment in equipment or material, or his employment of other workers; 

(4) the degree of skill required for the work; 

(5) the permanence of the working relationship; and 

(6) the degree to which the services rendered are an integral part of the putative employer’s business. 

McFeeley, 825 F.3d at 241. These factors are often called the “Silk factors” in reference to United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947), the Supreme Court case from which they derive. See Schultz at 305.

Generally speaking, the greater the degree of control the putative employer has over the manner in which the work is performed, the greater the permanence of the working relationship, and the greater the degree to which the worker’s services are an integral part of the putative employer’s business, the more likely the worker is an “employee” under the economic realities test. Similarly, the fewer opportunities the worker has for profit or loss dependent on his managerial skill, the less the worker invests in equipment, material, or employment of other workers, and the lower degree of skill required for the work, the more likely the worker is an “employee” under the economic realities test. 

Application

For example, in Schultz, the plaintiff security workers worked jointly for a Saudi prince and a security firm. The Fourth Circuit found the prince and security firm exercised nearly complete control over how the workers did their jobs. Further, the workers had no opportunity for profit or loss dependent on their managerial skills, as they were paid a set rate per shift. Additionally, the firm and prince supplied the workers with all the necessary equipment, including cell phones, cars, firearms, and cameras. With respect to the fourth factor, although some security duties required special skills, others did not. As to the permanence of the relationship, the prince employed some workers for several years and preferred to hire workers who would stay with him over the long term. And the services rendered by the workers were integral to the security firm’s business, as the firm’s only function was to provide security for the prince, and workers were hired specifically to perform that task. Considering these facts under the economic realities test, the Fourth Circuit concluded the security workers “were not in business for themselves” and “thus were thus employees, not independent contractors.” Schultz, 466 F.3d at 309.

Similarly, in McFeeley, the plaintiff exotic dancers worked for dance clubs. The Fourth Circuit found that the clubs exercised significant control over how the dancers performed their work. That control included dictating dancers’ schedules, imposing written guidelines that all dancers had to obey during working hours, setting fees the dancers were supposed to charge patrons for private dances, and dictating how tips and fees were handled. Further, the dancers’ opportunities for profit or loss depended far more on the clubs’ management and decision-making than their own; the club owners’ investment in the clubs’ operation far exceeded the dancers’ investment; the job duty of dancing at the clubs required a relatively minimum degree of skill; and the dance clubs could not function without exotic dancers. Therefore, the dancers were employees of dance clubs under the FLSA, rather than independent contractors. McFeeley, 825 F.3d 235, 242-244.

And in Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc., 848 F.3d 125 (4th Cir. 2017), the plaintiff drywall installers worked for a subcontractor of a larger company that offered general contracting and interior finishing services, including drywall installation, carpentry, framing, and hardware installation. The workers were economically dependent on the subcontractor alone, making them necessarily economically dependent on the contractor and subcontractor jointly. Due to the contractor’s daily supervision of these workers, it exercised greater control over their work than the subcontractor exercised alone. Further, the contractor provided all of the materials, supplies, tools, and equipment that workers used for their work. On these facts, the Fourth Circuit determined the drywall installers were employees covered by FLSA, rather than independent contractors, based on their entire employment for both the framing and drywall installation subcontractor and general contractor. Id. at 150-151.

Summary

In summary, Fourth Circuit courts determine whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor by looking to the “economic realities” of the relationship between the worker and the putative employer. The outcome is important because an employee may have rights to minimum wage and overtime compensation under the FLSA that an independent contractor performing the same basic job tasks does not. The “economic realities” test turns on whether the worker is economically dependent on the business to which he renders service or is, as a matter of economic reality, in business for himself. If the practical economic reality is that the worker is economically dependent on the putative employer and not in business for himself, the worker will generally be considered an employee qualified for FLSA rights. 

This site is intended to provide general information only. The information you obtain at this site is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship between you and attorney Tim Coffield or Coffield PLC. Parts of this site may be considered attorney advertising. If you have questions about any particular issue or problem, you should contact your attorney. Please view the full disclaimer. If you would like to request a consultation with attorney Tim Coffield, you may call 1-434-218-3133 or send an email to info@coffieldlaw.com.

This blog was also published to TimCoffieldAttorney.net.

The Fair Labor Standards Act requires employers to pay minimum hourly wages to covered employees. In some workplaces, like restaurants and hotels, the employer’s customers may leave tips directly for the workers. This aspect of American culture raises several questions about employee rights and  employer responsibilities under the FLSA. How does this form of payment impact the employer’s responsibility to pay a minimum wage? Can the employer take the tips from the worker? Can the worker who receives tips be required to give some to other employees? And if an employer improperly keeps tips, can the worker sue to recover the tips?

The 3(m) Tip Credit

The federal Department of Labor maintains excellent resources, such as Fact Sheet No. 15, for learning more about the FLSA’s requirements as they relate to tipped employees. Under the FLSA, an employer must pay employees a minimum hourly wage (currently $7.25). Also under the FLSA, tips left by customers are the property of the employee who receives them. “Tipped employees,” for purposes of the FLSA’s tip credit provisions, are employees who customarily and regularly receive tips. Only tips actually received by the employee may be counted in determining whether the employee is a tipped employee and in applying the tip credit.

The FLSA’s tip credit provision (Section 3(m)) allows an employer to take a “credit” toward its minimum wage obligation for tipped employees in an amount equal to the difference between the mandatory minimum cash wage for tipped employees (currently $2.13) and the federal minimum wage (currently $7.25). The maximum 3(m) tip credit that an employer can claim is therefore currently $5.12 per hour ($7.25 minimum wage minus the required tipped employee cash wage of $2.13). An employer may sometimes be able to claim an additional tip credit against its overtime obligations.

Tip Pooling

Section 3(m) also provides that an employer “may not keep tips received by its employees for any purposes, including allowing managers or supervisors to keep any portion of employees’ tips, regardless of whether or not the employer takes a tip credit.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(m)(2)(B).

In other words, tips are the property of the employee. This requirement, however, does not prohibit an employer from implementing a valid tip pool — i.e. requiring tipped employees to pool or share their tips with other employees who customarily and regularly receive tips, like servers, bellhops, counter personnel (who serve customers), and bussers. When the employer is taking a tip credit (and therefore, directly paying tipped employees less than the federal minimum wage), a valid tip pool may not include employees who do not customarily and regularly receive tips, like dishwashers, cooks, and janitors. However, in light of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, which amended parts of the FLSA tip requirements, when the employer is not taking a tip credit (and therefore tipped employees are directly paid at least full minimum wage) tipped employees may be required to pool their tips with non-supervisory employees who do not customarily and regularly receive tips, like cooks.

Under the FLSA, there is no maximum contribution amount or percentage on valid mandatory tip pools. The employer, however, must notify tipped employees of any required tip pool contribution amount, may only take a tip credit for the amount of tips each tipped employee ultimately receives, and may not retain any of the employees’ tips for any other purpose.

Section 3(m) Prohibits Employers From Keeping Tips Regardless of Whether They Take a Tip Credit

The language of section 3(m)(2)(B) makes clear that managers and supervisors are not permitted to keep any portion of an employee’s tips, regardless of whether the employer takes a tip credit. In other words, because tips are the property of the employee, the FLSA prohibits any arrangement whereby any part of the tip received by a tipped employee becomes the property of the employer. This means that even when the employer pays a tipped employee at least $7.25 per hour in direct wages, the employee may not be required to turn over his or her tips to the employer.

An employer who violates this section, and keeps an employee’s tips, or allows managers or supervisors to keep an employee’s tips, may be subject to a civil penalty of $1,100 for each such violation, in addition to being liable to the employee for all tips unlawfully kept, and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C. § 216(e)(2).

Requirements to Take a Tip Credit

To qualify to take a 3(m) tip credit, an employer must first provide the affected tipped employee(s) with the following information:

1) the amount of the cash wage the employer is paying the tipped employee (must be at least $2.13 per hour);

2) the additional amount claimed by the employer as a tip credit (cannot be more than $5.12 — the difference between the $2.13 minimum required cash wage for tipped employees and the current minimum wage of $7.25);

3) that the tip credit claimed by the employer cannot exceed the amount of tips actually received by the tipped employee;

4) that all tips received by the tipped employee are to be retained by the employee except for a valid tip pooling arrangement limited to employees who customarily and regularly receive tips; and

5) that the tip credit will not apply to any tipped employee unless the employee has been informed of these tip credit provisions.

See 29 U.S.C. § 203(m)(2)(A)(ii) & 29 C.F.R. § 531.59. An employer who fails to provide this required information cannot use the 3(m) tip credit. Therefore, an employer who fails to provide this information must pay the tipped employee at least $7.25 per hour in wages and allow the tipped employee to keep all tips received. Employers taking a tip credit must also be able to show that tipped employees receive at least the minimum wage when direct wages paid to the employee are added to the tip credit. If an employee’s tips plus direct wages do not equal at least the federal minimum wage, the employer must make up the difference.

Issues Raised by Dual Jobs

Sometimes, an employee will work in more than one position for the same employer, where one of the positions is tipped and the other is not. For example, an employee might work for a restaurant both as a server (tipped) and a cook (untipped). In this situation, the employee can take the tip credit only for the hours the employee works in the tipped position. Interestingly, however, the FLSA does allow an employer to take a tip credit for some time that the tipped employee spends performing duties related to the tipped position, even though those duties do not directly produce tips. For example, a server who spends some time setting up and cleaning tables, making coffee, and occasionally cleaning glasses or dishes, is considered to be engaged in a tipped occupation even though these duties do not produce tips. See the dual jobs regulation at 29 C.F.R. § 531.56(e).

Summary

In short, tips are the property of the employee. An employer may take a tip credit against its minimum wage obligations so long as it satisfies the notice requirements and the employee receives direct wages (at least $2.13 hourly) plus tips that together meet or exceed the federal minimum wage. An employer who takes a tip credit may only require tip pooling between customarily and regularly tipped employees. An employer who does not take a tip credit can require tip pooling between tipped and non-supervisory non-tipped employees. However, under no circumstances can an employer, including managers and supervisors, keep an employee’s tips for any purpose, regardless of whether the employer takes a tip credit.

This blog was also posted to TimCoffieldAttorney.net.

This site is intended to provide general information only. The information you obtain at this site is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship between you and attorney Tim Coffield or Coffield PLC. Parts of this site may be considered attorney advertising. If you have questions about any particular issue or problem, you should contact your attorney. Please view the full disclaimer. If you would like to request a consultation with attorney Tim Coffield, you may call 1-434-218-3133 or send an email to info@coffieldlaw.com.

ADA Job Restructuring Law

Can federal employment laws require an employer to change an employee’s job duties, as an accommodation for a disability? The answer is sometimes, depending on the circumstances. The analysis often turns on whether the duties at issue are “essential functions” of the employee’s job, and whether co-workers are available to take on the duties (in exchange for the disabled employee taking on some of their duties). 

Both Title I of Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504(a) of Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (for employers receiving federal funds) require employers to “mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 268 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that discrimination under Rehabilitation Act includes failure to accommodate and applying same standard as that used for ADA failure-to-accommodate claims).

Reasonable Accommodation Defined 

A reasonable accommodation is one that “enables [a qualified] individual with a disability … to perform the essential functions of [a] position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii). The ADA expressly contemplates that a reasonable accommodation may require “job restructuring.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). The Fourth Circuit holds that job restructuring to shift a marginal, nonessential task to other employees can be a reasonable accommodation, especially where replacement tasks are shifted back to the disabled employee to avoid increasing the overall workload of other employees. Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 580-81 (4th Cir. 2015) (“Jacobs’s proposed accommodation was to work fewer days at the counter and more days microfilming or performing other deputy clerk tasks. This proposed accommodation did not require the AOC to increase the workload of Jacobs’s coworkers; Jacobs merely asked that her employer change which deputy clerk was assigned to which task … A reasonable jury could therefore conclude that Jacobs’s requested accommodation was reasonable.”)

To prevail on a failure to accommodate claim, an employee must show: “(1) that [he] was an individual who had a disability within the meaning of the statute; (2) that the employer had notice of [his] disability; (3) that with reasonable accommodation [he] could perform the essential functions of the position; and (4) that the employer refused to make such accommodations.” Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 579 (quoting Wilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2013).)

The Essential Functions Questions

Job-restructuring implicates the third element, which asks whether the proposed restructuring accommodation would allow the employee to perform the “essential functions” of the position. Employers sometimes believe that if a duty is included in an employee’s job description, it is an “essential” function of the job, and therefore the ADA cannot require the employer to shift that duty to other employees. This is not necessarily true. While job descriptions may be relevant evidence in determining the essential functions of a job, they are not dispositive. As the Fourth Circuit holds:

Not all job requirements or functions are essential. A job function is essential when “the reason the position exists is to perform that function,” when there aren’t enough employees available to perform the function, or when the function is so specialized that someone is hired specifically because of his or her expertise in performing that function.

Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 579 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)). “[I]f an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (emphasis added)). “Other relevant evidence can include ‘the employer’s judgment as to which functions are essential,’ ‘the amount of time spent on the job performing the function,’ ‘the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function,’ and the work experience of people who hold the same or similar job.” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)).

Jacobs involved a court clerk with social anxiety who sought to have her job restructured so she did not have to work at the counter in the clerk’s office, and would perform additional clerk’s duties instead. Jacobs at 580. The Fourth Circuit held that even though the clerk’s job description named “customer service” as a function, working at the counter was not necessarily an “essential function” of the clerk position because, inter alia, “many employees were available to perform that function.” Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 580.

Job-Restructuring Accommodations

If applying these factors indicate the job duty at issue is not an essential function, the employer may have an obligation to shift that duty to other employees as a disability accommodation, with the disabled employee taking on some replacement duties so her co-workers do not have to do more work overall. Federal appellate courts applying the ADA consistently hold that job restructuring to shift non-essential functions can be a reasonable accommodation. In addition to Jacobs, see Rorrer v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1044 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Shifting marginal duties to other employees who can easily perform them is a reasonable accommodation.”); Henschel v. Clare County Road Com’n, 737 F.3d 1017, 1023–24 (6th Cir. 2013) (The “ADA requires job restructuring of non-essential duties as a reasonable accommodation in appropriate circumstances”; hauling the excavator not necessarily an essential function of the excavator operator position, as there were a number of other employees who could perform this task); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, 62 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that reasonable accommodation may “involv[e] reallocating the marginal functions of a job”); U.S. EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (“The ADA defines ‘reasonable accommodation’ to include restructuring a job, such as by removing non-essential functions from the job.”) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) and 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)); Davidson v. Am. Online, Inc., 337 F.3d 1179, 1192 (10th Cir. 2003) (“a restructuring of the non-essential requirements” of a job could be a reasonable accommodation); Hill v. Assocs. for Renewal in Educ., Inc., 897 F.3d 232, 240 (D.C. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 1201 (2019) (“an employer may be required to accommodate an employee’s disability by ‘reallocating or redistributing nonessential, marginal job functions,’ or by providing an aide to enable the employee to perform an essential function without replacing the employee in performing that function.” (quoting 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App.) (emphasis in original)).

To recap, under the ADA or Rehab Act, a reasonable disability accommodation could therefore entail shifting certain “non-essential” tasks to other employees and shifting from those employees to the disabled employee additional work that she can perform independently. See Jacobs at 580-81. Because this kind of accommodation would shift additional tasks back to the disabled employee and therefore not increase the overall workload of other employees, cases like Crabill v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 423 Fed.Appx. 314, 323 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting that “an accommodation that would require other employees to work harder is unreasonable”) would not apply.

This site is intended to provide general information only. The information you obtain at this site is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship between you and attorney Tim Coffield or Coffield PLC. Parts of this site may be considered attorney advertising. If you have questions about any particular issue or problem, you should contact your attorney. Please view the full disclaimer. If you would like to request a consultation with attorney Tim Coffield, you may call (434) 218-3133 or send an email to info@coffieldlaw.com.

This blog was also featured on TimCoffieldAttorney.net.

IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez: Law of Compensation for Waiting

The Fair Labor Standards Act requires employers to pay minimum wages and overtime wages based on time worked by covered employees. Oftentimes, an employee has to spend time waiting to put equipment, walking to a worksite, or doing other preshift tasks necessary to perform her job. Is the employee entitled to compensation under the FLSA for that time? Trial courts routinely address various iterations of this question. In IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005), the Supreme Court answered one of them. It held that the FLSA requires employers to pay employees for time spent walking to and from stations that distributed employer-mandated safety equipment.

Facts

Alvarez involved two separate but similar cases. Employees of IBP filed suit under the FLSA  seeking compensation for time they spent putting on and taking off (“donning and doffing”) required protective gear and walking between the locker rooms and the production floor of IBP’s meat processing facility. The trial court decided these activities were compensable. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. IBP appealed.

In the companion case, employees of Barber Foods sought compensation under the FLSA for time they spent donning and doffing required protective gear at Barber’s poultry processing plant, as well as time they spent walking and waiting associated with picking up and returning the gear. The trial court found in favor of Barber on the walking and waiting claims, finding those activities were not compensable. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that the walking and waiting times were preliminary and postliminary activities excluded from FLSA coverage by §§4(a)(1) and (2) of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947. The employees appealed.

The U.S. Supreme Court consolidated the cases to address the question of whether the FLSA requires employers to pay employees for time spent walking to and from stations that distributed required safety equipment.

Legal Background

In Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 691–692 (1946), the Supreme Court held that a “workweek” under the FLSA included the time employees spent walking from time clocks near a factory entrance to their workstations. In response to that decision, Congress passed the Portal-to-Portal Act. The Portal-to-Portal Act excepted from FLSA coverage walking on the employer’s premises to and from the location of the employee’s “principal activity or activities,” §4(a)(1), and activities that are “preliminary or postliminary” to “said principal activity or activities,” §4(a)(2).

The Department of Labor subsequently issued regulations which interpreted the Portal-to-Portal Act as not affecting the computation of hours within a “workday,” 29 CFR §790.6(a), which includes “the period between the commencement and completion” of the “principal activity or activities,” §790.6(b).

In a subsequent Supreme Court decision, Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956), the Court explained that the “term ‘principal activity or activities’ … embraces all activities which are ‘an integral and indispensable part of the principal activities,’ ” including the donning and doffing of specialized protective gear “before or after the regular work shift, on or off the production line.”

The Court’s Decision

In the 2005 Alvarez decision, the Court held that an employee putting on employer-required safety equipment qualified as a “principal activity” under the FLSA. The continuous “workday” for purposes of calculating compensable time began when employees started that activity. Therefore, compensable time included the subsequent time employees spent walking to and from the worksite after donning their protective gear, and time spent waiting to doff the gear. The Court further held that the previous time spent waiting to put on the safety equipment, however, was not included in the workday, and not compensable time, because it was a “preliminary” activity under the Portal-to-Portal Act. 546 U.S. at 28-38.

Time spent walking to and from the worksite after donning and before doffing protective gear is compensable time

First, the Alvarez held that the time the IBP employees spent walking after changing into protective gear from the locker room to the production floor was compensable under the FLSA.  546 U.S. at 33-37.

The Court explained that Section 4(a)(1) of the Portal-to-Portal Act text does not exclude this time from the FLSA. IBP had argued that, because donning is not the “principal activity” that starts the workday, walking occurring immediately after donning and immediately before doffing is not compensable. That argument, the Court pointed out, was foreclosed by its decision in Steiner, which clarified that §4 does not remove activities that are “integral and indispensable” to “principal activities” from FLSA coverage because those activities are themselves “principal activities.” 350 U. S. at 253. The Court went on to explain that that these identical terms cannot mean different things within the same law (§4(a)(2) and in §4(a)(1)). According to the normal rules of statutory interpretation, identical words used in different parts of the same statute are generally presumed to have the same meaning. Further, with respect to §4(a)(2)’s reference to “said principal activity or activities,” “said” is an explicit reference to the use of the identical term in §4(a)(1). Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 33-35.

The Court also rejected IBP’s argument that Congress’s repudiation of the Anderson decision (by passing the Portal-to-Portal Act) reflected a legislative purpose to exclude the walking time at issue from the FLSA. The Court found this argument unpersuasive because it observed the time at issue in Alvarez, which occurred after the workday begins (by donning) and before it ends (by doffing), was more comparable to time spent walking between two different positions on an assembly line than to the walking in Anderson, which occurred before the workday began. Id. at 34-35.

The Court also pointed out the DOL regulations supported the compensable nature of the IBP employees’ walking time. For example, 29 CFR §790.6 did not strictly define the workday’s limits as the period from “whistle to whistle.” And 29 CFR §790.7(g), n. 49, which provides that postdonning walking time is not “necessarily” excluded from  §4(a)(1) of the Portal-to-Portal Act, does not mean that such time is always excluded. Therefore, the Court determined those regulations could not overcome clear statements elsewhere in the regulations that supported the compensable nature of postdonning walking time. 546 U.S. at 35-37.

Time spent waiting to doff is compensable time

With respect to the Barber Foods employees, the Court similarly held that because donning and doffing gear that is “integral and indispensable” to employees’ work is a “principal activity” under the FLSA, the continuous workday rule required that the time the Barber Foods employees spent walking to and from the production floor after donning and before doffing, as well as the time spent waiting to doff at the end of the day, are not affected by the Portal-to-Portal Act. Therefore, this time was compensable under the FLSA. 546 U.S. at 37-39.

Time spent waiting to don is not compensable time

Finally, however, the Court held that time spent waiting to don protective gear before work is not compensable time. The Court’s reasoned that §4(a)(2) of the Portal-to-Portal Act excluded from the FLSA the time employees spend waiting to don the first piece of gear that marks the beginning of the continuous workday. The Court determined that this qualifies as a “preliminary” activity because it was “two steps removed” from the productive activity on the assembly line. While certain preshift activities were necessary for employees to engage in their principal activities, the Court found that this does not mean that those preshift activities are “integral and indispensable” to a “principal activity” under Steiner. The Court expressed a concern that it could not conclude that Barber employees predonning waiting time was a compensable “principle activity” without also reaching the necessary (but untenable) conclusion that the walking time in Anderson would also be a “principal activity” unaffected by the Portal-to-Portal Act. The Court observed that 29 CFR §790.7(h) (differentiating between being “engaged to wait,” which is compensable, and “wait[ing] to be engaged, which is not compensable) did not support a finding that time spent waiting to don protective gear was compensable. 546 U.S. at 39-42.

Analysis

In short, Alvarez held that an employee putting on employer-required safety equipment qualified as a “principal activity” under the FLSA. The continuous “workday” for purposes of calculating compensable time began when employees started that activity.

This determination, that the workday begins with donning, has two important implications. First, FLSA compensable time included the subsequent time employees spent walking to and from the worksite after donning their protective gear, and time waiting to doff their gear. Second, however, the previous time employees spent waiting to don the protective equipment was not included in the workday, and not compensable time, because it was a “preliminary” activity under the Portal-to-Portal Act.

This blog was also published at TimCoffieldAttorney.com.

This site is intended to provide general information only. The information you obtain at this site is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship between you and attorney Tim Coffield or Coffield PLC. Parts of this site may be considered attorney advertising. If you have questions about any particular issue or problem, you should contact your attorney. Please view the full disclaimer. If you would like to request a consultation with attorney Tim Coffield, you may call (434) 218-3133 or send an email to info@coffieldlaw.com.

Law of Joint Employment

Law of Joint Employment

A worker’s joint employers are jointly and severally liable for any violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc., 848 F.3d 125, 134 (4th Cir. 2017). This means that for purposes of the FLSA’s requirements that an employer pay minimum wages and overtime wages to non-exempt employees, a worker may have more “employers” than just the company who issues her paychecks. In short, if more than one entity has the ability to help determine the conditions of a workers’ employment, more than one entity may be liable if the worker is not paid the minimum wages or overtime compensation required by federal law.

DOL Joint Employment Regulations

The Department of Labor regulation implementing the FLSA distinguishes “separate and distinct employment” from “joint employment.” 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a). “Separate employment” exists when “all the relevant facts establish that two or more employers are acting entirely independently of each other and are completely disassociated with respect to the” individual’s employment. Id. By contrast, “joint employment” exists when “employment by one employer is not completely disassociated from employment by the other employer(s).” Id. When two or more entities are found to jointly employ a particular worker, “all of the employee’s work for all of the joint employers during the workweek is considered as one employment for purposes of the [FLSA].” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, for example, all hours worked by the employee on behalf of each joint employer are counted together to determine whether the employee is entitled to overtime pay under the FLSA. Id; Hall v. DIRECTV, LLC, 846 F.3d 757, 766 (4th Cir. 2017).

Fourth Circuit Factors

In Salinas, the Fourth Circuit observed that the joint employment regulations speak to “one fundamental question: whether two or more persons or entities are ‘not completely disassociated’ with respect to a worker such that the persons or entities share, agree to allocate responsibility for, or otherwise codetermine — formally or informally, directly or indirectly — the essential terms and conditions of the worker’s employment.” 848 F.3d at 141 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a) and citing In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Employment Practices Litig., 683 F.3d 462, 468 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[W]here two or more employers … share or co-determine those matters governing essential terms and conditions of employment — they constitute ‘joint employers’ under the FLSA.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

With these principles in mind, courts in the Fourth Circuit consider six factors in determining whether entities constitute joint employers:

(1) whether, formally or as a matter of practice, the putative joint employers jointly determine, share, or allocate the power to direct, control, or supervise the worker, whether by direct or indirect means;

(2) whether, formally or as a matter of practice, the putative joint employers jointly determine, share, or allocate the power to, directly or indirectly, hire or fire the worker or modify the terms or conditions of the worker’s employment;

(3) the degree of permanency and duration of the relationship between the putative joint employers;

(4) whether, through shared management or a direct or indirect ownership interest, one putative joint employer controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the other putative joint employer;

(5) whether the work is performed on a premises owned or controlled by one or more of the putative joint employers, independently or in connection with one another; and

(6) whether, formally or as a matter of practice, the putative joint employers jointly determine, share, or allocate responsibility over functions ordinarily carried out by an employer, such as handling payroll, providing workers’ compensation insurance, paying payroll taxes, or providing the facilities, equipment, tools, or materials necessary to complete the work. Id. at 141.

Salinas at 141.

The Fourth Circuit in Salinas observed that these six factors may not constitute an exhaustive list of all potentially relevant considerations. Id. at 142. “To the extent that facts not captured by these factors speak to the fundamental threshold question that must be resolved in every joint employment case — whether a purported joint employer shares or codetermines the essential terms and conditions of a worker’s employment — courts must consider those facts as well.” Id.

As these factors illustrate, the Fourth Circuit’s joint employer test turns on whether the entities in question codetermine the essential conditions of a worker’s employment. Salinas at 143. Thus, the existence of a general contractor-subcontractor relationship “has no bearing on whether entities … constitute joint employers for purposes of the FLSA.” Id. 143–44.

Application of Salinas Factors

For example, in Salinas, the Fourth Circuit held that a drywall installation subcontractor and general contractor were joint employers under the FLSA because, inter alia, the subcontractor provided staffing for the contractor based on the contractor’s needs; the employees performed the work for the contractor’s benefit; the contractor supervised the employees’ progress daily and provided feedback; and the employees wore uniforms bearing the contractor’s logo. 848 F.3d at 146.

For another Fourth Circuit case on the joint employer issue, see Hall v. DIRECTV, LLC, 846 F.3d 757, 762 (4th Cir. 2017). In that case, the plaintiff technicians sufficiently alleged DIRECTV as a joint employer, even though the technicians were nominally employed by a subcontractor. The court held that DIRECTV could be liable as a joint employer along with the subcontractor because, inter alia, the technicians were required to “obtain their work schedules and job assignments through DIRECTV’s centralized system,” to check in with DIRECTV after completing assigned jobs, and to “wear DIRECTV uniforms…when performing work for the company.” Similarly, in Young v. Act Fast Delivery of W. Virginia, Inc., 2018 WL 279996, *8 (S.D. W.Va. Jan. 3, 2018), the court held that under Salinas, a pharmaceutical delivery company was a joint employer of the plaintiff couriers, even though the couriers were nominally employed by a third party subcontractor.

As the Fourth Circuit emphasized in Salinas, “Separate employment exists when … ‘two or more employers are acting entirely independently of each other and are completely disassociated with respect to’ the individual’s employment.” 848 F.3d at 133-34 (emphasis in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a)). “By contrast, joint employment exists when ‘the facts establish … that employment by one employer is not completely disassociated from employment by the other employer.’” Salinas at 134 (emphasis in original).

Summary

Therefore, under the Fourth Circuit’s framework, the “fundamental question” guiding the joint employment analysis is “whether two or more persons or entities are ‘not completely disassociated’ with respect to a worker such that the persons or entities share, agree to allocate responsibility for, or otherwise codetermine — formally or informally, directly or indirectly — the essential terms and conditions of the worker’s employment.” Id. at 140. If the facts show that two related companies were not “completely disassociated” or “acting entirely independently” with respect to a worker’s employment, they may be joint employers. If the entities shared control over the conditions of employment, they may both be potentially jointly and severally liable for FLSA violations as joint employers.

This site is intended to provide general information only. The information you obtain at this site is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship between you and attorney Tim Coffield or Coffield PLC. Parts of this site may be considered attorney advertising. If you have questions about any particular issue or problem, you should contact your attorney. Please view the full disclaimer. If you would like to request a consultation with attorney Tim Coffield, you may call 1-434-218-3133 or send an email to info@coffieldlaw.com.

McKennon v. Nashville Banner: Law of After-Acquired Evidence

McKennon v. Nashville Banner: Law of After-Acquired Evidence

What happens when an employer, having wrongfully terminated an employee (in violation of federal employment law), discovers in litigation that the employee did something that would have legitimately and lawfully lead to termination, had the employer known about it before wrongfully firing the employee? Does the employer still have to pay lost wages for the wrongful termination, or does this “after-acquired evidence” excuse the violation?

The Supreme Court addressed these questions in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995). The Court rejected the argument that a legitimate reason for termination, discovered after an unlawful discharge, excuses the unlawful action or bars the employee from recovery. However, the Court also indicated that such after-acquired evidence may limit the employee’s ability to obtain reinstatement or recover all lost wages associated with the termination.

Facts

McKennon worked thirty years for Nashville Banner Publishing Company until she was terminated at age sixty-two. McKennon filed suit, alleging that her discharge violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). McKennon’s suit sought a variety of legal and equitable remedies available under the ADEA, including backpay. In her deposition, McKennon admitted that during her final year of employment she had copied and taken home several of the Banner’s confidential financial documents. 513 U.S. 354-56.

For the purposes of summary judgment, the Banner conceded that it had discriminated against McKennon because of her age. Id. The District Court, however, granted summary judgment for the company, holding that McKennon’s misconduct in taking the confidential documents was grounds for termination and that neither back pay nor any other remedy was available to her under the ADEA. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the same reasoning. McKennon appealed. Id. at 355-56.

The Court’s Decision

The Court reversed. It held that an employee who is fired in violation of federal employment law is not barred from all relief when, after her discharge, her employer discovers evidence of wrongdoing that would have led to her termination on lawful and legitimate grounds had the employer known of it. 513 U.S. 356-360.

After-Acquired Evidence Not a Complete Bar

First, the Court held that this kind of “after-acquired evidence” is not a complete bar to recovery. The Court reasoned that even if the employee engaged in misconduct that would have prompted a termination, the employer’s discrimination that actually prompted the discharge cannot be disregarded. The Court assessed the purposes of the ADEA’s remedial provisions, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) and 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which (like the remedial provisions of other employment laws) were designed both to compensate employees for injuries caused by unlawful discrimination and to deter employers from discriminating in the first place. The Court concluded that allowing after-acquired evidence to bar all relief would frustrate both of these important objectives. Therefore, the Court held that after-acquired evidence did not bar all relief for unlawful discrimination. Id. at 358-360.

Relevance to Crafting an Appropriate Remedy

Second, however, the Court observed that trial courts should take into account after-acquired evidence of an employee’s wrongdoing in determining the specific remedy for the employer’s discrimination. To hold otherwise, and bar any consideration of employee misbehavior in the relief analysis, would be to ignore the employer’s legitimate concerns about employee misconduct. The ADEA, like other employment laws, just prohibits discrimination. It does not limit employers from having legitimate rules and exercising appropriate lawful discretion in hiring, promoting, and firing employees. Therefore, the Court noted, employee wrongdoing is relevant in taking due account of such lawful prerogatives and the employer’s corresponding equities arising from the wrongdoing. Id. at 360-61.

General Rule: No Reinstatement or Front Pay

Third, the Court discussed how trial courts might balance these competing concerns — on one hand, the prohibition against unlawful discrimination, and on the other, the employer’s right to address legitimate employee misconduct in an appropriate manner. The Court decided that remedial relief in such cases should be addressed on a case-by-case basis. However, the Court stated that as a general rule, if the employer proves the employee engaged in misconduct that would have prompted a lawful termination had the employer known about it, neither reinstatement nor front pay is an appropriate remedy. Id. at 362. This is because “it would be both inequitable and pointless to order the reinstatement of someone the employer would have terminated, and will terminate, in any event and upon lawful grounds.” Id.

Possible Limitations on Back Pay

The Court indicated that the more difficult issue, in after-acquired evidence cases, is the proper measure of back pay. This is because even a guilty employer cannot be required to ignore information it learns about employee wrongdoing that would lead to a legitimate discharge, even if it is acquired during the course of a discrimination lawsuit and might have gone undiscovered in the absence of the discrimination that led to the lawsuit. Id. at 362. The Court stated that the “beginning point in formulating a remedy should therefore be calculation of backpay from the date of the unlawful discharge to the date the new information was discovered.” Id. In determining the appropriate relief, the court can consider extraordinary equitable circumstances that affect the legitimate interests of either party. But an “absolute rule barring any recovery of backpay, however, would undermine the [federal employment law’s] objective of forcing employers to consider and examine their motivations, and of penalizing them for employment decisions that spring from … discrimination.” Id. Thus, as a general rule, after-acquired evidence does not bar back pay, but it might limit the amount of back pay an employee can recover.

No Bar to General Compensatory, Punitive, or Liquidated Damages

It is also worth noting that McKennon did not state or suggest that compensatory damages for past or future emotional harm should be time-limited. The decision only addressed possible limitations on lost wages and reinstatement. Allowing full emotional distress damages even if the defendant prevails on an after-acquired evidence defense makes good sense in light of McKennon’s reasoning. This is because no legitimate business prerogative would be served by allowing a proven discriminator to avoid paying the full cost of the emotional damage caused by the discrimination. The same reasoning supports the conclusion that after-acquired evidence does not bar punitive damages or liquidated damages, in cases where the usual standards for awarding punitive or liquidated damages are met. Here is a link to EEOC’s guidance on this issue.

Employer’s Burden of Proof

Finally, the Court discussed the employer’s burden in attempting to prove an “after-acquired evidence” defense. When an employer seeks to use this defense, it must first establish that the wrongdoing was of “such severity that the employee in fact would have been terminated on those grounds alone had the employer known of it at the time of the discharge.” Id. at 362-63. The Court also expressed concern that, due to the possibility of uncovering after-acquired evidence, employers might routinely undertake extensive discovery into an employee’s background or job performance to resist employment discrimination claims. Id. at 363. However, the Court concluded the trial courts’ authority to award attorney’s fees under §§ 216(b) and 626(b) and to invoke the appropriate provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would likely deter most abuses of the discovery rules. Id.

Analysis

The Court in McKennon rejected the notion that a legitimate reason for termination, discovered after an unlawful discharge, excuses the unlawful action or bars the employee from recovery. However, such after-acquired evidence may limit the employee’s ability to obtain reinstatement or recover all lost wages associated with the termination. To use this defense, an employer must prove that the employee engaged in misconduct of such severity that the employee would have been terminated on those grounds alone had the employer learned of it during her employment. As a general rule, if the employer meets this burden, reinstatement is not an appropriate remedy and back pay may be limited.

This site is intended to provide general information only. The information you obtain at this site is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship between you and attorney Tim Coffield or Coffield PLC. Parts of this site may be considered attorney advertising. If you have questions about any particular issue or problem, you should contact your attorney. Please view the full disclaimer. If you would like to request a consultation with attorney Tim Coffield, you may call 1-434-218-3133 or send an email to info@coffieldlaw.com.

Corning Glass Works v. Brennan: EPA Law Requires Equal Pay for Equal Work

In Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974), the Supreme Court addressed the allocation of proof in pay discrimination claims under the Equal Pay Act of 1963. This was the first Supreme Court decision applying the Equal Pay Act. The Court held that to prevail on an EPA claim, the plaintiff must prove that the employer pays an employee of the one sex more than it pays an employee of the other sex for substantially equal work. The opinion addressed what it meant for two employees to perform “substantially equal work” for the purposes of the Equal Pay Act, including what it means for work to be performed under “similar working conditions.” 

Facts

Corning was a glassworks company. It employed night shift inspectors and day shift inspectors at its plants. For many years, Corning allowed only men to work the night shift, and it paid night shift inspectors more than it paid the day shift inspectors, who were women. In June 1966, three years after the passage of the Equal Pay Act, Corning began opening the night shift jobs to women, allowing female employees to apply for the higher-paid night inspection jobs on an equal seniority basis with men.  

In January 1969, Corning implemented a new “job evaluation” system for setting wage rates. Under that pay system, all subsequently-hired inspectors were to receive the same base wage (which was higher than the previous night shift rate) regardless of sex or shift. With respect to employees hired before the new pay system went into effect, however, the pay plan provided that those employees who worked the night shift would continue to receive a higher (“red circle”) rate. Because of this “red circle” rate, the new pay system perpetuated the previous difference in base pay between day and night inspectors, thereby also perpetuating the previous disparity in pay between female (day) inspectors and male (night) inspectors. 

The Equal Pay Act prohibits an employer from paying different wages to employees of opposite sexes “for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions,” except where the difference in payment is made pursuant to a seniority or merit system or one measuring earnings by quantity or quality of production, or where the differential is “based on any other factor other than sex.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)

The Secretary of Labor brought suit, asserting that Corning’s pay practices violated the EPA by paying male and female inspectors differently for equal work. 

The Court’s Decision

The Court addressed the question of whether Corning’s pay practices violated the EPA by paying different wages to employees of opposite sexes for “equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions[.]” The Court found that they did. 

First, the Court held that Corning’s pay practices from the passage of the EPA in 1963 to June 1966 violated the EPA, because during that period the night shift inspectors (all male) were paid more than the day shift inspectors (female) and the night shift and day shift inspectors performed equal work “under similar working conditions.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). Corning argued the difference between working at night and working at day meant the different positions did not entail similar working conditions. The Court rejected this argument, holding that the EPA’s legislative history established that the statutory term “working conditions,” as used in the EPA, encompasses only physical surroundings and hazards, and not the time of day worked. 417 U.S. 197-204.

Corning also argued that the pre-1966 pay disparity was lawful because the higher pay to (male) night inspectors was intended as additional compensation for the inconvenience of night work, and thus the pay disparity was based on a “factor other than sex[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). The Court rejected this argument, holding the evidence showed the pay disparity in fact arose because men would not work for the low rates paid to women inspectors. The pay disparity therefore “reflected a job market in which Corning could pay women less than men for the same work.” 417 U.S. 204-05.

Second, the Court held that Corning did not remedy its violation of the EPA in June 1966 simply by permitting women to work as night shift inspectors, because the violation could only be cured by increasing the base wages of female day inspectors to meet the higher rates paid to night inspectors. Corning’s action in allowing women to work the night shift did not accomplish this, as “Corning’s action still left the inspectors on the day shift — virtually all women — earning a lower base wage than the night shift inspectors because of a differential initially based on sex and still not justified by any other consideration[.]” 417 U.S. 207-08. In effect, “Corning was still taking advantage of the availability of female labor to fill its day shift at a differentially low wage rate not justified by any factor other than sex.” Id. Thus, Corning’s allowing women to work the night shift, without increasing base pay to the female day shift workers, did not remedy the EPA violation. 

Finally, the Court held the Corning did not remedy its violation of the EPA in January 1969 with its pay plan equalizing day and night inspector rates, because the plan’s higher “red circle” rate paid to employees who previously worked the night shift only perpetuated the previous unlawful pay disparity. This was because the previously-hired male night shift workers would receive the higher red circle rate based on their pre-1969 pay — before day and night wage rates were equalized. Thus, the pay plan had the unlawful effect of continuing the pay disparity between men and women for equal work. As the Court observed, “the company’s continued discrimination in base wages between night and day workers, though phrased in terms of a neutral factor other than sex, nevertheless operated to perpetuate the effects of the company’s prior illegal practice of paying women less than men for equal work.” 417 U.S. 209-10.

Analysis

This case was important because it marked the first time the Supreme Court addressed the requirements of the Equal Pay Act. The Court held that to prevail on an EPA claim, the plaintiff must prove that the employer pays an employee of one sex more than it pays an employee of the other sex for substantially equal work. The opinion addressed what it meant for two employees to perform “substantially equal work” for the purposes of the EPA, and held that the requirement for work to be performed under “similar working conditions” referred to physical surroundings and hazards, and not the time of day worked. If a male employee and a female employee perform equal work at different times of the day, they should therefore be given equal pay — unless the pay disparity is based on a seniority or merit system or one measuring earnings by quantity or quality of production, or where the differential is “based on any other factor other than sex.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). If an employer’s pay practices violate the EPA, the only way to cure the violation is to equalize wages between men and women — simply offering women the same job titles is not sufficient. And pay systems that have the effect of perpetuating prior discrimination may still violate the EPA — even if the pay system is neutrally-worded and made without intent to discriminate. 

This site is intended to provide general information only. The information you obtain at this site is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship between you and attorney Tim Coffield or Coffield PLC. Parts of this site may be considered attorney advertising. If you have questions about any particular issue or problem, you should contact your attorney. Please view the full disclaimer. If you would like to request a consultation with attorney Tim Coffield, you may call 1-434-218-3133 or send an email to info@coffieldlaw.com.

Civil Rights Act of 1866: Racial Discrimination Unlawful

Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in the aftermath of the Civil War, when many southern states were passing laws restricting the legal rights of newly-freed slaves. The 1866 Act, among other things, conferred upon “all citizens” and “all persons” the same rights to own property and to make and enforce contracts, respectively. 

Since 1866, the Act has been re-enacted several times with some modifications. Of particular importance in the employment context, one portion of this law is now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In relevant part, Section 1981 provides that “All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right … to make and enforce contracts … as is enjoyed by white citizens[.]” Because the employer-employee relationship is a type of contractual relationship, Section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the employment context. 

In practice, Section 1981 functions similarly to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in that it prohibits employers from intentionally discriminating against employees on the basis of race. For example, the tests for proving a racially hostile work environment asserted under Section 1981 and Title VII are the same. Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 277 (4th Cir. 2015). Under both laws, an employer is liable for a racially hostile workplace when the plaintiff can show “(1) unwelcome conduct; (2) that is based on the plaintiff’s … race; (3) which is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiff’s conditions of employment and to create an abusive work environment; and (4) which is imputable to the employer.” Id. at 277 (citing Okoli v. City of Balt., 648 F.3d 216, 220 (4th Cir. 2011)). 

Title VII and Section 1981 differ, however, in several important aspects.

Section 1981 Requires Intentional Discrimination

Title VII contains a provision that makes it unlawful for employers to implement practices that impact individuals of one race more than individuals of other races, even if this employer did not intend for the practice to be discriminatory. This “disparate impact” provision of Title VII prohibits an employer from “us[ing] a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race [or other protected characteristics]” so long as the employer “fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job-related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A). Thus, an employer can violate Title VII’s prohibition on racial discrimination without intending to do so. 

Section 1981 does not have an analogous provision. Section 1981 claims, therefore, require evidence of intentional discrimination. The Supreme Court has rejected the argument “that a violation of § 1981 could be made out by proof of disparate impact….” Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 383 n.8 (1982). In discussing the history of the statute and comparing it to Title VII, the Court explained Section 1981 was enacted to prevent purposeful discrimination and “did not include practices that were neutral on their face … but that had the incidental effect of disadvantaging blacks to a greater degree than whites.” Id. at 388. (quotation omitted).

Section 1981 Does Not Require an EEOC Charge

To bring a race discrimination claim under Title VII in court, a plaintiff must first file a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Before she can file a Title VII race discrimination claim in court, the plaintiff must then wait for the EEOC to complete its investigation and issue a Notice of Suit Rights. By contrast, a plaintiff may bring a lawsuit under Section 1981 for racial discrimination without first going through the EEOC process. 

Section 1981 Has a Longer Statute of Limitations than Title VII

Title VII claims have a relatively short statute of limitations — depending on the state, Title VII race discrimination claims generally must be reported to the EEOC within 180 or 300 days of the employer’s discriminatory actions, and a Title VII lawsuit must be filed in court within 90 days of the employee’s receipt of suit rights from the EEOC. By contrast, the text of Section 1981 does not specify a particular time limit within which claims must be filed. Section 1981 violations are therefore subject to the general four-year statute of limitations for civil actions arising under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1658. Section 1981 claims may therefore be brought in court within four years of the discriminatory action at issue. 

Title VII Covers More Types of Discrimination than Section 1981

Section 1981 only applies to discrimination based on race. Title VII, by contrast, outlaws race discrimination as well as discrimination based on “religion, sex, and national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

Section 1981 Applies to All Employers, Regardless of Size

Title VII only prohibits racial discrimination by employers with fifteen or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Section 1981, by contrast, contains no such limitation. Because the terms of Section 1981 apply to all forms of contracting, it applies to all employers regardless of size — including employers with fewer than fifteen employees.

Both Laws Allow Recovery of Compensatory and Punitive Damages, but Section 1981 Does Not Cap Damages

Title VII is subject to caps limiting the amount of compensatory and punitive damages an employer may be required to pay for violating the law. The applicable caps range from $50,000 to $300,000, depending on how many employees the employer has. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). The relevant statute authorizes compensatory damages for “future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). The same statute further allows punitive damages against private-sector employers for Title VII violations if the plaintiff shows the employer “engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1).

Section 1981, by contrast, does not include a cap on damages. While the text of Section 1981 does not specifically discuss damages, courts have affirmed compensatory damages awards under Section 1981, Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), and held that a prevailing Section 1981 plaintiff is entitled under the common law to punitive damages “under certain circumstances,” Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975). Specifically, punitive damages may be awarded “for conduct [by the defendant] exhibiting malice, an evil motive, or recklessness or callous indifference to a federally protected right,” Stephens v. South Atlantic Canners, Inc., 848 F.2d 484, 489 (4th Cir. 1988); Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 206 F.3d 431, 441 (4th Cir. 2000). This standard comes from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983), in which the Court held that punitive damages are available under the common law in an action under the civil rights statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith, 461 U.S. at 56. 

This site is intended to provide general information only. The information you obtain at this site is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship between you and attorney Tim Coffield or Coffield PLC. Parts of this site may be considered attorney advertising. If you have questions about any particular issue or problem, you should contact your attorney. Please view the full disclaimer. If you would like to request a consultation with attorney Tim Coffield, you may call 1-434-218-3133 or send an email to info@coffieldlaw.com.